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We estimate the responses of gross labor earnings with respect to marginal and average net-
of-tax rates in France over the period 2003-2006. We exploit a series of reforms to the 
income-tax and the payroll-tax schedules that affect individuals who earn less than twice the 
minimum wage. Our estimate for the elasticity of gross labor earnings with respect to the 
marginal net-of-income-tax rate is around 0.2, while we find no response to the marginal net-
of-payroll-tax rate. The elasticity with respect to the average net-of-tax rates is not significant 
for the income-tax schedule, while it is close to -1 for the payroll-tax schedule. A plausible 
explanation is the existence of significant labor supply responses to the income-tax schedule, 
combined with a short-term rigidity of the hourly taxable wage (i.e. the gross wage minus 
payroll taxes), casting doubts about public finance analysis that assumes perfect competition 
on the labor market. Finally, the effect of the net-of-income-tax rate seems to be driven by 
labor supply participation decisions, in particular those of females. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Labor income taxation is composed of several distinct schedules. According to the OECD tax 
database,
1 the total tax wedge for an average-wage worker amounts to 29.7% of labor costs to the 
employer in the U.S. in 2010. This tax wedge can be decomposed into 8.2% for transfers to the 
“central government”, 5.8% for transfers to “sub-central” governments, and 15.8% for “social security 
contributions”. In France at the same time, the total tax wedge for an average-wage earner amounts to 
49.3%, with only 9.9% for transfers to the central government and 39.3% for social security 
contributions. Whether or not earnings respond identically to the different schedules is crucial to 
determine which type of tax should be used to finance public expenditures, including social security 
expenses and redistribution. In this work, we focus on the relative responsiveness of labor earnings to 
payroll (social contributions) taxation versus income taxation. 
The most usual models of the labor market (including the standard labor supply model, the 
monopoly-union model under right-to-manage, or the individual wage bargaining model) predict 
identical earnings responses to payroll-tax and to income-tax schedules. By contrast, the empirical 
evidence is so far not conclusive because the existing literature never simultaneously considers the 
responses to payroll taxes and to income taxes,
2  one reason being the absence of simultaneous reforms 
to both schedules for similar individuals over the same period.  
In contrast to the literature, we exploit a series of reforms to both the income-tax and the 
payroll-tax schedules that occurred in France over 2003-2006 for individuals in the bottom half of the 
wage distribution. In 2003, there existed two distinct schedules for the reduction in employers’ payroll 
taxes for low-wage workers, depending on whether the firm had moved to the 35-hour workweek or 
had remained at 39 hours. A progressive convergence between the two schedules was implemented 
from 2003 and achieved in July 2005. This resulted in opposite effects for the two types of firms: an 
increase in the reduction in employers’ payroll taxes for those remained at 39 hours and a decrease in 
the reduction for those that had moved to the 35-hour workweek. Over the same period of time, the 
Prime pour l’Emploi, a working tax credit for low-wage earners, has been substantially increased, the 
maximum amount of benefits being almost doubled from 2003 to 2006. Exploiting this rich set of 
reforms that affected workers who earn less than twice the minimum wage gives us the very unlikely 
opportunity to compare the responsiveness of labor earnings to income-tax and to payroll-tax reforms.  
                                                      
1 Authors’ calculations from OECD tax data base available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/3/1942514.xls   
2 Most of the papers focus on the distortions induced by income taxes (e.g. Feldstein (1995), Auten and Caroll 
(1999), Gruber and Saez (2002), Saez (2003), Blomquist and Selin (2010), Cabannes, Houdré and Landais 
(2011) among others. Another strand of the literature estimate the effects of payroll tax reforms (e.g. Gruber 




The dataset we use is the Enquête Revenus Fiscaux, which combines income tax records from 
the fiscal administration with the French Labor Force Survey (hereafter LFS). Whereas the 
information contained in income tax records allows us to compute the income tax schedule (including 
the tax credit for low-wage earners), the LFS provide all the variables necessary to reconstruct 
employer and employee payroll taxes. In particular, the labor market history and the usual weekly 
working time enable us to infer a monthly wage and an hourly wage, which are the basic inputs for 
calculating payroll taxes respectively before and after the reform. We are also able to infer whether the 
firm has moved to the 35-hour workweek or has remained at 39 hours, which determines which 
payroll tax schedule applies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses income tax 
records matched to the Labor Force Survey to investigate the responsiveness of labor income to both 
income-tax and payroll-tax reforms. 
We estimate the short-term gross wage (or labor cost) responses to the marginal and average 
net-of-tax rates
3 for both schedules. We find a significant elasticity (around 0.2) of labor earnings with 
respect to the marginal net-of-income-tax rate. By contrast, the elasticity of labor earnings with respect 
to the marginal net-of-payroll-tax rate is statistically insignificant and close to zero. Labor earnings 
thus respond differently to payroll-tax and to income-tax changes, at least in the short-run. This 
finding contrasts with the theorical predictions of the most common labor market models. We also find 
that the income effects of payroll-tax and income-tax changes are different. The elasticity with respect 
to the average net-of-payroll-tax rate does not differ significantly from minus one, while the elasticity 
with respect to the average net-of-income-tax rate is significantly lower in absolute term. 
Our preferred interpretation for these findings is significant labor supply responses to the 
income-tax schedule, combined with a short-term rigidity of the hourly taxable wage (i.e. the gross 
wage minus payroll taxes) over this period. The effect of an income-tax reform works through rapid 
labor supply modifications. Further investigations suggest that this response is essentially due to 
female participation decisions. By contrast, the hourly taxable wage is probably determined through 
bargaining, which does not occur every year, implying that the response of gross wages to payroll-tax 
changes is delayed. Our results suggest in particular that, at least in the short-run, financing social 
security expenses and redistribution through payroll taxes is less distortive than through income taxes 
(e.g. through a rise in the amount of working tax credit). Our results also imply that, in France, 
reducing employer payroll taxes for low paid jobs actually decreases the labor cost to the employer, 
without any significant effect on the net wage. Hence, we do not find that the reduction in employer 
payroll taxes for low paid jobs has exacerbated a “low-wage trap” in France.
4 Finally, the plausibility 
of taxable wage rigidity suggests that the assumption of a competitive labor market might be 
                                                      
3 The marginal (respectively average) net-of-tax rate is equal to one minus the marginal (average) tax rate.  
4 Our result is in line with two other studies using French data, Aeberhardt and Sraer (2009), and Bunel, Gilles, 
and L’Horty (2009), but differs from that of Lhommeau and Remy (2009) also for France.  
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inadequate for applied public finance, at least in the short-run and for economies such as France where 
the labor market is highly regulated. As the latter assumption is made in a large part of the optimal 
income tax literature (e.g. Mirrlees (1971)), one can question the relevance of the normative 
predictions derived by these models. 
A large strand of the literature is interested in the response of taxable income to the marginal 
net-of-income-tax rate, following the idea of Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) that this elasticity 
summarizes all the deadweight losses due to taxation. We here compare our results with the main 
conclusions of this literature. i) The literature considers that the elasticity is hard to identify, in 
particular because of the difficulties to control for non-tax related changes in income. We better 
account for these changes by using additional control variables provided by the Labor Force Survey. 
ii) At a first look, our estimate of 0.2 for the elasticity with respect to the marginal net-of-income-tax 
rate belongs to the range of the most plausible values found in the literature (between 0.12 and 0.4 
according to Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2010) or around 0.33 for the intensive margin according to 
Chetty (2011)). However, we here estimate the response of labor earnings while most works are 
interested in the responses of taxable total income. Restricting the comparison to taxable labor 
income, our estimate is consistent with that of Blomquist and Selin (2010), who find significant 
responses, whereas differing from Saez (2003) who suggests that labor earnings do not significantly 
respond to taxation. iii) The existing literature suggests that the elasticity is presumably much higher 
for top income earners (e.g. Gruber and Saez (2002)). However, we obtain a significant elasticity of 
labor earnings with respect to the marginal net-of-income-tax rate by using reforms that affect 
individuals in the bottom half of the wage distribution. iv) Finally, our result that labor earnings are, at 
least in the short-run, insensitive to the marginal payroll-tax rate is consistent with those found by 
other studies (e.g. Liebman and Saez (2006), Saez et alii (2011)). More specifically, it is in line with 
different studies using French data. The novelty is that we exhibit simultaneously the 
unresponsiveness of taxable wages to payroll taxes and their responsiveness to income taxes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the different elasticity concepts and 
discusses theoretically whether labor earnings should respond identically to income taxes and payroll 
taxes. In section III, we present our empirical strategy and discuss the identification. Section IV 
describes the dataset used, which combines income tax records with the Labor Force Survey. In 
section V, we detail the institutional backgrounds and expose the main reforms that took place in 
France over the 2003-2006 period. Section VI presents results on the respective effects of payroll taxes 






II. Theoretical backgrounds 
II.1 Definitions 
Because of the existence of taxes and transfers, the (annual) net wage c that a worker can 
consume differs from the gross wage (or labor cost) w paid by her employer. In most countries, labor 
earnings taxation can be decomposed into social security contributions or payroll taxes (that finance 
social security programs such as PAYG pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, etc.) and 
taxes to governments or income taxes.  
We represent the payroll tax as a function of the gross wage and we denote it with a 
superscript P: T
P(w). We denote by z the taxable wage, defined as the gross wage minus payroll taxes. 
On a linear part of the payroll tax schedule, we get: 
 











1  denotes the marginal  net-of-payroll-tax rate and R
P is the virtual taxable 







P P       the average net-of-payroll-tax rate.  
The income tax schedule, denoted with a superscript I, consists of income tax per se and of tax 
credits providing income subsidies to low-wage earners (e.g. Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S., 
Prime Pour l’Emploi in France, etc.). The income tax is a function of the taxable wage z: T
I(z). On a 
linear part of the income tax schedule, the net wage c equals the taxable wage z minus income taxes, 
implying that: 
 











1   denotes the marginal net-of-income-tax rate and R
I is the virtual net income. 







I I       the average net-of-income-tax rate. Combining Equations (1) and 
(2) gives the budget constraint:  
 
I P I P I R R w c            (3) 
 
We thus define the global marginal net-of-tax rate as 
I P    , the global virtual income as 
I P I R R R   , and the global average net-of-tax rate c/w as 
I P    .  
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For j=I,P, the elasticity    
j j W w      captures the change in gross wages generated by a 
tax reform that not only modifies the slope of the budget constraint (3), but also the amount of tax 
paid. This is the reason why it is referred to as the uncompensated elasticity with respect to the 
marginal  j  net-of-tax rate. However, the theory of optimal taxation puts more emphasis on 
compensated elasticities. These ones capture the response of gross wages to tax reforms that modify 
the slope of the tax schedule while leaving unchanged the amount of tax paid at the pre-reform 
earnings level.
5 Formally, let w* and z* denote respectively the initial gross and taxable wages, with 
z*= 
P w*+ R
P. Then, the compensated elasticity with respect to the marginal payroll (respectively 
income) net-of-tax rate 
P
   (respectively 
I
  ) captures the effect on gross wages of a payroll 
(respectively income) tax reform that varies the marginal net-of-payroll-tax rate 
P (respectively 
marginal net-of-income-tax rate 
I) and the virtual taxable income R
P (respectively virtual net income 
R
I) in such a way that the amount of payroll (resp. income) tax paid at w* (resp. at z*) is kept 
unchanged, i.e. R
P = - w* 
P (resp. R
I = -z* 
I). The compensated elasticities are thus given by 











































 *    (5) 
 
For a given level of the gross wage w*, the change 
P in the average payroll net-of tax rate 
equals 
P+(R
P/w*), while the change 












































*      (6) 
                                                      
5 For instance, when the choice of w reflects a labor supply decision in a competitive labor market and the labor 
demand is infinitely elastic, the compensated elasticity captures only substitution effects while the 
uncompensated one captures both substitution and income effects. Then, the deadweight losses associated with 




where the elasticity 
P
   (respectively 
I
  ) with respect to the average payroll (respectively income) 

































  In a large class of models of the labor market, the gross wage (or labor cost) is determined by 
the maximization of an objective function that depends negatively on the gross wage w to the firm and 




c U U   0 . We henceforth refer to this class of models as the “benchmark” ones. The textbook 
labor supply framework is typically one of them. In this framework, a worker of productivity p 
supplying L units of labor earns a gross wage w = p L. If her preferences over consumption and labor 




c u u   0 , one can define function U by 
U(c,w) ≡ u(c,w/p). The objective U is decreasing in the gross wage w because earning a higher gross 
wage w requires working more intensively (i.e. higher L). The monopoly union model (under right-to-
manage) is also a benchmark model (Hersoug, 1984). If the union’s objective over net wages c and 
employment L is described by u(c,L) and if the labor demand is described by the decreasing function 
L=l
d(w), then function U is defined by U(c,w)  ≡ u(c,l
d(w)). Here, U is decreasing in the gross wage 
because the labor demand depends negatively on the labor cost. Lastly, wage bargaining settings (e.g. 
Lockwood and Manning, 1993, Pissarides, 2000) are other examples of benchmark models. In these 
frameworks, function U(c,w) is given by the generalized Nash product where the worker’s (or union’s) 
contribution to the Nash product is increasing in the net wage c, while the firm’s contribution is 
decreasing in w, as higher gross wages lower profits. However, it is worth noting that, for the 
monopoly union model as well as for the wage bargaining model, the objective function takes the form 
U(c,w) only if the wage setting concerns homogenous workers and firms, which implies that the wage 
and the tax schedules are unique. Hence, only bargaining models at the individual level (e.g. as in 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) or at collective levels but for homogenous labor markets can be 
reduced to the maximization of this type of objective. 
In any benchmark model, the gross wage is determined by the maximization of U(c,w) subject 
to (3), the taxable wage z being an intermediate variable that is economically irrelevant. Formally, we 
have: 
 
    R w R w U w
w





This implies that the various tax parameters influence the gross wage only through the global marginal 
net-of-tax rate, 
I P    , and the global virtual income, 
I P I R R R   . The function W then 











I  )      (8) 
 
Let   and  define respectively the compensated elasticity with respect to the global 
marginal and average net-of-tax rates. Then applying the same Slutsky-alike decomposition as made in 



































    ( 6 ’ )  
 
As shown in Appendix A.3, the second-order condition together with the assumption that the 
objective U is increasing in c ensures that  is positive. Moreover, in the labor supply framework, 
assuming in addition the normality of leisure implies that  is negative. Finally, the restriction on W 
given by Equation (8) implies that: 
 
0   
I P
           and   
I P
             (9) 
 
Prediction (9) is obtained in the very large class of benchmark models. Therefore, if estimating 
Equation (6) leads to reject (9), it means that the above-mentioned models are rejected by the data. 
One should then look for alternative frameworks that can account for such departures. We have a 
priori three alternatives in mind that we now describe.  
                                                      






P. Equations (5), (7) and (6) then directly give (5’), (7’) and (6’) (see Appendix A.2).  
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First, the "salience" (in the sense of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)) of income-tax reforms 
and of payroll-tax reforms may be different. For instance, one can argue that, as payroll taxes are paid 
on a monthly basis while income taxes are paid on an annual basis with one year lag in France, wages 
react more rapidly to changes in payroll taxes and more slowly to changes in income taxes. In this 
case, 
I
   and 
I
   are expected to have the same sign but to be lower in absolute terms than 
P
   and 
P
   respectively. Conversely, one may argue that individuals are much more aware of the income tax 
schedule than of the payroll tax schedule. This would imply that 
I
   and 
I
   have the same sign but 
are larger in absolute terms than respectively 
P
   and 
P
  . 
Second, payroll taxes finance various social programs. For some of these programs, both the 
eligibility and the benefit level are related to the payroll taxes paid. The most illustrative example is 
the pension system, where the benefit level received upon retirement depends explicitly on both the 
level and duration of contributions. Unemployment insurance and health insurance also exhibit this 
contribution-related property. In case of job loss, the maximum duration of UI benefits depends on the 
duration of contributions. In case of sick leave, health insurance gives benefits that again depend on 
the level of past contributions. When payroll taxes per se generate benefits with some probability, the 
objective to maximize must be modified by adding a function of the level of payroll taxes into 
consumption. Therefore, the gross wage solves: 
 
        w R w k R w U R R W w
P p
w
P I I P , 1 max arg , , ,            
 
In this specification, the parameter k captures how the overall level of consumption depends 
on the level of payroll taxes through the payments of various social benefits. Different arguments 
suggest that k is small. First, benefits depend on wages more directly than indirectly through the 
amount of payroll taxes. Second, as the level of benefits paid depends on the whole labor market 
history (in particular for pensions), current contributions determine only partially this level. Third, 
these benefits will be given only in the future, and with some probability, which generates discounting. 
We hence assume that k < 
I and k < 
I. As the objective to be maximized does no longer verify 
restriction (8), prediction (9) is not verified as well. Actually, when the benefit level depends on the 
payroll taxes paid, the elasticity with respect to the marginal (average) net-of-payroll-tax rate is lower 
(in absolute term). We show in Appendix A.4 that (9’) is verified instead of (9): 
 
I P
      0         and     
I P




Third, consider a labor supply model where individuals have preferences u(c,L) over 
consumption c and labor supply L. Under perfect competition, an individual’s hourly gross wage 
equals her marginal product of hours worked. Now, assume instead that the hourly taxable wage 
(denoted s) is rigid. Then, when a worker supplies L units of labor, she receives the taxable wage 
z=sL. Given the budget constraint (2), she thus chooses her labor supply to maximize U(c,z) =u(c,z/s). 























    
Given that z =  w, this leads to w/w=z/z - 
P/




       0 
I
     and    1  
P
       (9’’) 
 
III.  Empirical strategy 
 
Our objective is to evaluate separately the responses of annual gross wages to reforms to the 
payroll-tax and to the income-tax schedules. We then estimate the following empirical counterpart of 
Equation (6) for an individual i employed at t-1 and t: 
 










t i u X w , 1 , , , , , , log log log log log                              (10) 
 
where  is the time-difference operator between dates t and t-1, Xi,t-1 is a vector of observed individual 
and firm characteristics at t-1, and ui,t is an error term that captures unobserved heterogeneity. In 
specifying the empirical setup, we are aware that heterogeneous individuals may respond to tax 
changes differently. Hence, we only provide evidence on the average of these behavioral elasticities, 
i.e. on the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). 
Various methodological issues complicate the estimation. A first issue is the existence of non-
tax related changes in gross wages. For example, technical progress and international trade generate 
changes in gross wages, that are likely to be different across firm size and industry, age category, level 
of education, etc., and presumably lead to a widening of the wage distribution. The risk when 
evaluating a tax reform that reduces the marginal tax rate for top income earners, such as TRA86 in 
the U.S., is to attribute changes in wages to the reform rather than to “non-tax” causes, thereby causing 
an upward bias in the elasticity estimate (Gruber and Saez (2002)). To better account for these non-tax  
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related changes, we include in Xi,t-1 additional control variables provided by the LFS, which describe 
individual and firm characteristics. 
Reversion-to-the-mean constitutes another source of non-tax factors. An individual with an 
unusually low (respectively high) labor income in period t-1 is very likely to have a higher (lower) one 
at t. This is typically what happens when an individual enters unemployment (or involuntary part-time 
work) during year t-1. Her labor income is then unusually low and increases substantially in year t if 
she finds a permanent (or full-time) job. In order to control for reversion-to-the-mean, the standard 
procedure in the literature is to include a flexible function of base-year income, f(log wi,t-1), in the 
vector of controls Xi,t-1. Auten and Caroll (1999) use a linear function while Gruber and Saez (2002) 
use a very flexible 10-piece spline. As a flexible specification allows one to better control for 
reversion-to-the-mean but may destroy identification (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2010)), we choose to 
include a fifth-order polynomial of the log of base gross wages log(wi,t-1) in the list of controls.  
However, including f(log wi,t-1) and individual and firm characteristics in Xi,t-1 may be 
insufficient to control for mean reversion, trends in the gross wage distribution or unobserved 
heterogeneity.
7 In particular, log wi,t-1 is likely to be correlated with ui,t if the residuals of Equation (10) 
are serially correlated. Formally, if ui,t is not a white noise process, then    1 , , log  t i t i w u Ε  is different 
from zero (Holmlund and Söderström, (2008), Blomquist and Selin (2010)), implying that log wi,t-1 
(and the subsequent terms of the polynomial) must be instrumented. As our dataset provides 
information on gross wages in year t-2, a natural instrument for wi,t-1 is  2 2 , 2 ,      t t i t i w w  , where t-2 
denotes the average growth rate of (nominal) gross wages between years t-2 and t-1. This instrument is 
valid, provided that the error term ui,t follows a MA(1) process.  
Another issue concerns the potential simultaneity bias. Because of the nonlinearity of, 
respectively, the payroll-tax and the income-tax schedules, the marginal net-of-tax rates 
P
t i,   and 
I
t i,   
are functions of the gross wage level. Similarly, the average net-of-tax rates 
P
t i,   and 
I
t i,   depend on 
the gross wage as well, the reason being that the marginal and the average rates differ. In order to 
isolate the impact of taxes on gross wages, we need instruments for 
j
t i, log   and 
j
t i, log  , with 
j=P,I. In the literature, the standard procedure, proposed by Auten and Caroll (1999), uses the 
predicted change in the log of the net-of-tax rate would the real wage do not change from year t-1 to 
year t. By construction, the instrument captures changes in the tax rate absent any behavioral response. 
We apply this method separately to the marginal and the average net-of-tax rates associated with the 
two tax schedules. Let  1 1 , 1 ,      t t i t i w w   denote the base-year inflation-adjusted gross wage, where 
                                                      
7 In the literature, there is no proof that this procedure is sufficient.  
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t-1 is the average growth rate of gross wages between years t-1 and t. We note with an upper bar the 
net-of-tax rates obtained by applying the year-t tax schedule to 1 ,  t i w . We then define for j =P, I 
 


























   






t i 1 , , , log log log        . 
Moreover,    0 log 1 , ,   t i t i w u Ε  may also (but not necessarily
8) imply that 
j
t i, log   is not a valid 
instrument for  j =P, I and. This leads us to propose a second group of instruments based on 
year  t-2 inflation adjusted gross wages  1 2 2 , 2 ,        t t t i t i w w    for year t, and on 
2 2 , 2 ,      t t i t i w w   for year t-1. We then define, for j =P, I 






























































Using the above definitions, type-II instrument for 
j






t i 1 , , , log log log        , with j=P, I and . Having two instruments for 
j
t i, log   allows 
us to test their validity.
9 
 
IV.  The data 
 
The existing empirical literature uses either administrative income tax records (e.g. Feldstein, 
1995, Auten and Caroll, 1999, Gruber and Saez, 2002) or payroll tax records (e.g. Saez et alii, 2011). 
Although administrative tax records have the advantage of providing exhaustive and longitudinal data, 
they contain limited information on individual characteristics and no information on labor market 
history and firms characteristics. Since the main goal for collecting these data is policy-oriented, only 
                                                       
8 The endogeneity of wi,t-1 does not necessarily imply the endogeneity of the instruments, because 
P
t i,  ,
I
t i,  , 
P
t i,  and
I
t i,  are non-monotonic functions of wi,t-1. 
9 Holmlund and Söderström (2008) use the same instrument as our type-II one. Blomquist and Selin (2010) 
propose another strategy. They regress both wi,1991 and wi,1981 on wi,1986 and on a set of controls and use the 
predicted values to build their instruments. In any case, instruments are valid only under some assumption on the 
serial correlation of the residuals.  
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the variables necessary to compute taxes are provided. In contrast to the existing literature, we use a 
research-oriented dataset, the Enquête Revenus Fiscaux (hereafter ERF), resulting from the match of 
the French Labor Force Survey to administrative income tax records. Specifically, the individuals 
interviewed at the 4
th quarter of year t in the LFS are matched with their t+1 administrative income tax 
records to generate the year-t wave of the ERF dataset. The LFS is a rotating 18-month panel that 
starts a new 18-month wave every quarter. As individuals are interviewed during six consecutive 
quarters, they are at best present during two consecutive years in the ERF dataset. We use the 2003-
2006 waves of the ERF because reforms to both the payroll-tax and the income-tax schedules occurred 
during this period for similar individuals. The individuals sampled thus appear either in 2003 and 
2004, in 2004 and 2005, or in 2005 and 2006. As the LFS contains detailed information on personal 
characteristics (in particular education), on labor market history and on the characteristics of the job 
(in particular usual weekly hours of work, industry), we are able to control in a rich way for mean 
reversion and for other trends in the gross wage distribution. 
We now describe the wage variable we use. The year-t administrative income tax records 
contains information on the annual taxable wage earned by each member of the household (i.e. z 
defined as the gross wage minus payroll taxes) at dates t-2, t-1, and t. The variable is reported by the 
employer and controlled by the fiscal administration, and as such is reliable. However, our aim in this 
work is to evaluate the respective effects of payroll taxes and income taxes on gross wages. While the 
ERF does not directly provide gross wages, it contains information useful to reconstruct this variable 
by applying the legislation on employer and employee payroll taxes. Payroll taxes are paid each month 
and are calculated as a function of the monthly and the hourly taxable wages. They depend on the firm 
size, the type of work,
10 and whether or not the firm has moved to the 35-hour workweek. As the LFS 
contains all these variables (with the exception of the 35-hour workweek, which is inferred), we can 
reconstruct payroll taxes, and thereby gross wages. The monthly taxable wage is obtained by matching 
the annual amount drawn from tax records to the labor market history described by the LFS.
11 
We build our own simulator for the payroll tax system. For the income tax schedule, we use a 
tax simulator adapted from the INES (INsee Etudes Sociales) micro-simulation model provided by 
INSEE and DREES. Using these simulators, we compute the average payroll and income taxes, and 
simulate the marginal payroll and income tax rates generated by a 5% increase in taxable wages. As 
administrative tax records provide also information on taxable wages at t-1 and t-2, we are able to 
compute our two types of instruments: instrument I based on wi,t-1 and instrument II based on wi,t-2. 
We restrict the sample to individuals who experienced no change in their marital status between dates 
t-1 and t, since those who marry, divorce, or become widowed have to report several fiscal returns. In 
                                                       
10 Engineers, managers and professionals face a specific payroll tax code.  
11 Each quarter, the individuals interviewed in the LFS report their taxable monthly wage. As this information is 
self-declared, it is less reliable than the annual taxable wages provided by the fiscal administration, and we do 
not use it.  
 
14
addition, we exclude public sector workers, as they face up very specific labor market regulations, and 
the self-employed. We also exclude the individuals for whom we cannot determine with a high degree 
of certainty whether or not they work under the 35-hour arrangement.
12 Finally, we restrict the sample 
to employees who report a positive labor income at dates t-1 and t. Our final sample comprises 12,512 
individuals observed at two consecutive years. 
 
Figure 1: The distribution of net, taxable, and gross wages in 2004.  
 
The distributions of the annual gross wage (w), taxable wage (z), and net wage (c) on our 
sample in 2004 are displayed in Figure 1. The three distributions appear hump-shaped, with a fat upper 
tail (particularly for gross wages). Due to the high level of payroll taxes in France, the distribution of 
taxable wages lies far to the right of the distribution of taxable wages, which itself lies slightly to the 
right of the distribution of net wages. 
 
 
Figure 2: The distributions of the ratio of taxable wages to the minimum wage, 2003-2006.  
                                                       
12 Using the legal and usual weekly hours of work, and the existence of additional vacations (RTT), we are able 
to infer whether the individual is working in a 35-hour firm or in a 39-hour firm at dates t and t-1. Given that, 
since 2003, few firms have moved to the 35-hour workweek, we are confident about the firm working time when 
it is the same at dates t and t-1. As a result, we restrict the sample to employees who work either 35 hours or 39 





Figure 2 describes the distributions in 2003-2006 of the ratio of the individual’s taxable wage 
to the taxable wage of an individual working full-time for the full-year at the minimum wage, hereafter 
the “annual minimum wage”. For each year, the mode of the distribution of the ratio is around 1.4. 
However, the proportion of employees between 1 and 1.4 times the minimum wage increased, 
essentially between 2004 and 2005, while the proportion around 2 times the minimum wage decreased 
slightly. 
 
Age  Economic activity   
< 20 years   0.1 % Agriculture  1.5 % 
20 - 29 years  13.4 % Manufacturing   26.8 % 
30 - 39 years  29.4 % Construction  7.2 % 
40 - 49 years  33.4 % Energy  1.6 % 
50 - 59 years  22.9 % Education and social activities  9.9 % 
 60 years  0.8 % Trade and repair  17.0 % 
Gender  Other tertiary  35.9 % 
Women 42.1  % Job tenure  
Men  57.9 % < 1 year  6.0 % 
Household composition  1 - 5 years  25.4 % 
Single individual  11.1 % 5 - 10 years  18.6 % 
Single parent    6.3 %  10 years   50.0 % 
Couples without children  20.3 % Firm size  
Couples with children  59.5 % < 10 employees  13.6 % 
Other households  2.8 % 10-19 employees  7.0 % 
Change in the number of children   20 employees  79.4 % 
Birth of a child between t and t-1  5.5 % 35-hour workweek  76.0 % 
Departure of a child between t and 
t-1 
6.2 % 35-hour workweek and < 20 employees  8.6 % 
No change   88.3 % 35-hour workweek and  20 employees  67.4 % 
Level of education   
College (> 2 years)  11.1 % 
College ( 2 years)   17.5 % 
High school graduate   16.0 % 
High-school drop-out or vocational diploma   38.3 % 
Junior high school or basic vocational  7.5 % 
No diploma or elementary school  9.6 % 
N° observations  12 512 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Some summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Due to the selection criteria, those who are 
under the age of 30 and over the age of 60, as well as women, are under-represented in the sample. 
Only 3 over 4 employees work in a firm under the 35-hour workweek regulation, even though the 
working time reduction is legally enforced since 2000 for large firms and 2002 for small firms. If 
employees in large firms are more likely to work in a firm under the 35-hour workweek regulation 
than employees in small ones, a significant part of them continue to work in a firm under the 39-hour 
workweek regulation (15% of all individuals working in a firm with more than 20 employees). Family  
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events like the birth of a child or a child leaving the fiscal household occur for respectively 5.5% and 
6.2% of the individuals. 
 
Figure 3: Means of the growth rate of gross wages for each percentile of the wage distribution 
 
Figure 3 describes for each base year the growth rate of gross wages (logwi,t) along the wage 
distribution. To make the curves comparable across time, we represent the growth rate as a function of 
the ratio of gross wages to the annual full-time minimum wage. Given the variability of growth rates 
among individuals with the same earnings level, we compute the means within each percentile of the 
taxable wage for each year. Figure 3 stresses the reversion-to-the-mean phenomenon at the bottom end 
of the wage distribution. The most plausible explanation for this fact is exit from unemployment/entry 
into stable employment between years t-1 and t. 
 
 
V. Institutional backgrounds  
 
We now describe the reforms to the payroll-tax and the income-tax schedules that occurred in 
France during the 2003-2006 period.  
 
  V.1 Income tax reforms 
 
By “income tax” we designate the sum of the income tax per se and of a tax credit for low-
paid earners (Prime pour l’emploi, hereafter PPE). Income tax per se in France is calculated at the 
fiscal household level, which differs from the usual notion of household: two persons who live as a 
couple are considered by the administration as a single fiscal household only if they are married or 
linked by a civil contract
13. The income-tax schedule is a function of the ratio of the total income 
earned by the fiscal household to a weighted sum of its members. The amount of tax paid then equals 
                                                       
13 Pacte civil de solidarité (PACS).  
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the income tax that would be paid by a single individual whose income is equal to this ratio, multiplied 
by the weighted sum. This implies that both the marginal and average net-of-tax tax rates of a given 
individual change with marital status, spouse’s income, at the birth of a child, or when a child becomes 
adult and exits the household. However, these events are likely to affect the labor supply decisions, the 
only exception being the exit of a child which generates an instantaneous change in the tax schedule, 
while the change in the labor supply, if any, is likely to be smoothed over time. Therefore, income tax 
reforms provide more convincing sources of identification than these family events. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the complexity of the tax schedule, the very large range of income tax rates that can face 
different individuals with the same income improves the identification possibilities associated with a 
fiscal reform.   
Over the 2003 – 2006 period covered by our dataset, there are several changes in the income 
tax code per se. In 2004 and 2005, tax brackets are indexed for consumer price inflation. This 
generates a form of bracket ‘creeps’ (Saez (2003)), as labor earnings have increased more rapidly than 
inflation over this period. A more substantial reform in 2006 reduces the number of brackets from 
seven to five and modifies the rates.  
However, the reform that generates the larger changes in tax rules over 2003-2006 is the 
increase in the Prime pour l’Emploi, a tax credit conditional on working that was created in 2001. 
Both eligibility for the tax credit and the amount of subsidy paid depend essentially on the individual 
full-time equivalent annual wage, but the total income earned by the household and its composition 
also intervene. More precisely, eligibility requires that the individual’s annual wage is above 0.3 and 
that her full-time equivalent annual wage is lower than 1.4 times the annual minimum wage for a 
single worker without children (up to 2.1 times the annual minimum wage for some household 
compositions). Considering the wage distribution in France,
14 this implies that one-third of the 
employees are eligible for the working tax credit.
15 We now describe the scheme for a single 
individual without children. There is a phase-in range between 0.3 and 1 time the annual minimum 
wage in which the tax credit is proportional to the wage. Unlike the EITC in the US, there is no 
plateau range: the phasing-out range is between 1 and 1.4 times the annual minimum wage. The 
entrance in the phase-in income range leads to a reduction in both marginal and average tax rates. The 
entrance in the phase-out income range is associated with a rise in the marginal tax rate, since a higher 
wage reduces the tax credit. The average tax rate is minimal at the minimum wage level and then 
increases. While the PPE scheme remains essentially unchanged in 2004 with respect to 2003, major 
changes occur both in 2005 and 2006, as described in Figure 4. As a result, the maximum level of the 
                                                       
14 In France in 2006, 22% of the employed earn a wage between 0.3 and 1.4 times the minimum wage, and 50% 
get a wage between 0.3 and 2.1 times the minimum wage. 
15 Compared to the EITC or the WFTC, the French tax credit thus differs on two points: a much larger share of 
the population is eligible; the presence of children has a very limited effect on the amount of benefit.  
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subsidy increases from 4.6% of the annual minimum wage (i.e. 517€ per year) in 2003 to 7.7% in 
2006 (i.e. 948€ per year).  
  
Figure 4: Reforms to the French income tax credit, 2003-2006 
Note: the amount of PPE is expressed as a percentage of yearly labor earnings. The figure describes the scheme for 
a single worker without children. For couples or singles with children, the “phasing-out” of the PPE scheme can go 
up to 2.1 times the minimum wage.    
 
Figure 5a (respectively 5b) depicts the evolution of the marginal 1-
I (respectively average 1-
I) 
income-tax rate simulated on our sample through the years 2003-2006. Even though the rates are very 
noisy, especially for part-time workers below the full-time minimum wage, for each year we observe 
that the marginal rate is much higher between 1 and 1.4 times the annual minimum wage than 
elsewhere. Moreover, as expected, the increase in the tax credit from 2003 to 2006 leads the marginal 
income-tax rate to increase significantly in this phase-out range. It also reduces the average income-tax 
rate, especially at the minimum wage level where the PPE is maximal. The tax reforms generated by 
the income-tax per se are conversely much less apparent, except for the reduction in the average tax 
rate between 2005 and 2006 for gross wages above two times the annual minimum wage. 
 





Figure 5b: Means of Average Income tax rates for each percentile of the wage distribution 
Sample: Employees present two consecutive years. Source: ERF survey, Insee, 2003-2006. 
 
 
V.2 Payroll tax reforms 
 
In almost all countries, payroll taxes are flat, apply only to earnings below a given cap and are 
roughly invariant over time. As they are flat and time-invariant, their effect is difficult to identify, 
which explains why there are few empirical works on how payroll taxes affect labor supply and labor 
demand. By contrast, in France, the rate of payroll taxes paid is a function of wages since the 
introduction in 1993 of a reduction in employer payroll taxes for low-wage employees (see e.g. 
Kramarz and Phillipon (2001) for a description of the policy and an evaluation of its effects on 
employment).  
Since June 1998, the situation was complicated further by the existence of two reduction 
schedules, depending on whether or not the employee is working under the 35-hour arrangement. At 
this date, a law implemented by a left-wing government initiated the move to a 35-hour workweek, a 
process that became in principle mandatory for large firms (more than 20 employees) in January 2000 
and small firms in January 2002. The firms moving from a 39-hour to a 35-hour workweek (hereafter 
the “35-hour firms”) were given an additional reduction in employer payroll taxes compared to the 
firms remained at 39 hours (hereafter the “39-hour firms”). As all firms were intended to move to the 
35-hour workweek, the existence of two types of tax subsidies was not a long-term problem. However, 
the process of reduction in the workweek was stopped in June 2002 when a right-wing government 
came into power. At this date, a non-negligible proportion of firms had not moved to the 35-hour 
workweek and had no intention to move later (Table 1). As a result, a law in January 2003 was 
planning the creation of a unique tax subsidy schedule, that applied whether or not the firm had moved 





Figure 6: Changes in the reduction in employer payroll taxes for low paid earners 
 
Figure 6 presents the changes in the tax subsidy from 2003 to 2006 for the two types of firms. 
At the beginning, in January 2003, the two subsidy schedules differ substantially. For a 39-hour firm 
(solid curves), the reduction in employer payroll taxes reaches a maximum of 18.2 percentage points at 
1 times the hourly minimum wage, then decreases up to 1.3 times the minimum wage. For a 35-hour 
firm (dashed curve), the reduction amounts to a maximum of 26 percentage points at 1.076 times the 
hourly minimum wage, then decreases up to 1.94 times the minimum wage.
16 For the 39-hour firms, 
the maximum percentage points of reduction increases from 18.2 in 2003 to 26 in 2006. Moreover, the 
phase-out income range widens from an initial 1 to 1.3 times the minimum wage to 1 to 1.6 times the 
minimum wage. For the 35-hour firms, the maximum percentage points of reduction remains 
unchanged, whereas the phasing-out part of the schedule shifts to the left from 1.076 to 1.94 times the 
minimum wage to 1 to 1.6 times the minimum wage. In average over the period 2003-2006, the tax 
subsidy decreases for the 35-hour firms while increasing for the 39-hour ones. 
Simulating the payroll taxes on our sample of individuals, we find that the marginal payroll 
tax rate is very high on the phase-out part of the schedule, amounting in 2006 to 57 % between 1 to 1.6 
times the minimum wage versus 43 % above 2 times the minimum wage. For those working 35 hours, 
Figure 7a shows that the income range with very high marginal tax rates shrinks from 2003 to 2006 
but that these marginal rates are still higher, as expected from the description of the reform. Turning to 
average tax rates (Figure 7b), we observe that they do not change over time at the minimum wage 
level and above 2 times the minimum wage. However, the gross wage above which the average 
payroll tax rate is the highest diminishes, as time goes on.  
                                                       
16 In order to prevent the reduction in the work week to lower the monthly wage, the (hourly) minimum wage 
regulation (SMIC for Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance) was supplemented by a system of 
monthly minimum wage regulation called GMR (Guarantie Mensuelle de Rémunerations) which depends also 
on the date at which firms adopted the 35-hour work week. In 2003 for a firm having moved to the 35-hour in 
2000, the GMR2 is equal to 1.076 times the minimum wage. The reduction is maximal at 1 times the GMR and 
decreases up to 1.8 times the GMR. The GMR has decreased with respect to the minimum wage from 2003 to 





Figure 7a: Means of Marginal Payroll tax rates for each percentile of the wage 
distribution in the 35-hour firms subsample 
 
 
Figure 7b: Means of Average payroll tax rates for each percentile of the wage 
distribution in the 35-hour firms subsample 
Sample: Employees present two consecutive years. Source: ERF survey, Insee, 2003-2006. 
 
For those working 39 hours, we observe a rise over time in the marginal payroll tax rate for 
wages comprised between 1.3 and 1.6 times the minimum wage, as expected from the widening of the 
phase-out part of the schedule (Figure 8a). By contrast, the average payroll tax rate is significantly 
reduced at the minimum wage level, following the increase in the maximum percentage points of 
reduction. The decrease in average tax rates vanishes progressively as one moves rightwards along the 
wage distribution.  
 
Figure 8a – Means of Marginal Payroll tax rates for each percentile of the wage 





Figure 8b - Means of Marginal Payroll tax rates for each percentile of the wage 
distribution in the 39-hour firms subsample 
Source: ERF survey, Insee, 2003-2006. Sample: Employees present two consecutive years. 
 
 
VI.  Results 
VI.1  Effects of payroll and income taxes 
 
We estimate Equation (10) using the 2SLS approach. The Sargan test leads us to conclude that 
type-I and type-II instruments are valid. The first-stage regressions are displayed in Table B.1 of 
Appendix B. The F-statistics of the excluded instruments are always high, meaning that the 
instruments are strongly correlated with the instrumented regressors. As type-I instruments are better 
for marginal net-of-tax rates, and type-II instruments better for average net-of-tax rates, we choose to 
use both of them.  
Table 2 displays our estimates of the gross wages responses for various sets of controls. The 
full results are presented in Table B.2 in Appendix B. In Column 1 of Table 2, the only covariates are 
time dummies and a fifth-order polynomial of the log of base year gross wages. In Column 2, we add 
socio-demographic covariates drawn from tax records concerning age, gender, and the composition of 
the household. In Column 3, the set of covariates furthermore includes variables drawn from the LFS. 
These variables describe the educational level, type of occupation, firm size, industry, job tenure, and 
whether the firm has moved to the 35-hour workweek. We also introduce dummies interacting the 
working time regulation of the firm and the year. Our objective in including these dummies is to 
account for the differences in minimum wage regulations between the two types of firms over 2003-
2006. In 2002, the binding minimum wage regulation (GMR) for 35-hour firms implied a minimum 
wage 8.2% higher than for 39-hour firms. Similarly as with the payroll tax schedule, a progressive 
convergence between the two minimum wage regulations was implemented in 2003 and achieved in 
July 2005.  
We first examine the elasticity with respect to the marginal net-of-income-tax rate. The 
elasticity estimate is slightly above 0.2, significant, and rather robust to changes in the set of  
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covariates. Our results are thus consistent with those of Blomquist and Selin (2010) for males in 
Sweden, who find an elasticity of taxable labor income around 0.25. Our estimate also belongs to the 
[0.12; 0.4] interval that Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2010) argue is the most plausible. It is worth noting, 
however, that they consider taxable income, not taxable labor income, and believe the former to be 
more responsive to taxation. In particular, Saez (2003), comparing the effect of taxes on different 
definitions of income in the U.S. over the period 1979-1981, finds significant responses of both 
taxable income and adjusted gross income, while the elasticity of labor income is close to zero. 
Another difference with the existing literature is that we use reforms whose stronger effects occur for 
individuals below the median of the wage distribution, whereas most of the literature uses reforms 
occurring in the top of the distribution. High-income individuals are expected to be more sensitive to 
taxes, in particular because they have more access to avoidance opportunities. The literature usually 
considers that responses to marginal tax rates are essentially driven by those individuals (e.g. Gruber 
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      1.15 0.89 1.07 
[31.7%] [41.03%]  [34.22%] 
Over-identification Sargan test  6.13 5.53 3.71 
[18.9%] [23.65%] [44.6%] 
Tax records variables  No  Yes  Yes 
LFS variables  No  No  Yes 
N° of Observations  12,512  12,512  12,512 
Table 2 – Estimates of the elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rates 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5% and *** significance at 1%. Estimation by 2SLS using instruments I and II. All regressions include time 
dummies and a fifth-order polynomial of the log of base year gross wages. 
Sample: employees present two consecutive years. 
Source: ERF survey, Insee, 2003-2006. 
 
Conversely, our estimate for the effect of marginal net-of-payroll-tax rates on gross wages 
P
   
is close to zero and not significant. This finding is obtained whatever the set of controls is. This 
finding is in line with Saez, Matsaganis and Tsakloglu (2010) for Greece, and with Aeberhardt and 
Sraer (2009) for France. However, it differs from Lhommeau and Remy (2009), also for France, who 
find that the progressivity of payroll taxes has a negative effect on wage growth. Our result that gross  
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wages do not respond to marginal payroll tax rates suggests that, at least in the short run, the efficiency 
costs of financing social security expenses and redistribution through payroll taxes are lower than 
through income taxes. 
We now turn to income effects. The elasticity with respect to the average income net-of tax 
rate is negative and significant (only at the 10% level in column 3). This contrasts with the literature 
which usually does not find significant income effects  (e.g. Gruber and Saez (2002)). We also find 
that the elasticity with respect to the average net-of-payroll-tax rate is negative and significant. The 
parameter varies between -1.4 and -1.7, and are reinforced when adding LFS controls. However, we 
cannot reject that it is equal to -1, which suggests that wages are negotiated net-of employer payroll 
taxes. A decrease in employer payroll taxes seems almost entirely absorbed by employers and thus 
actually reduces the labor cost, without any significant effect on taxable wages. 
Our result that gross wages are insensitive to marginal payroll tax rates, whereas they respond 
to income tax rates has important implications. Section II shows that a large class of theoretical 
models of the labor market predicts identical elasticities, as expressed by (9). This class includes the 
textbook labor supply model where the hourly gross wage equals the marginal productivity of labor. 
According to F-tests, the evidence for France is that Equation (9) is strongly rejected (at the 1% level 
for model (1) and at the 5% level for models (2) and (3)). This therefore suggests that the textbook 
“competitive – labor supply” model that underlies most of public finance analysis (e.g. Mirrlees 
(1971)) may be inadequate.  
Moreover, our estimates also lead us to reject prediction (9’) since gross wages respond more 
to marginal income than to marginal net-of-payroll-tax rates, but less to average income than to 
average net-of-payroll-tax rates. As argued in Section II, our results are not supportive of the idea that 
people understand differently the consequences of income taxes and payroll taxes. Our findings also 
reject models where payroll taxes generate benefits that are internalized in the formation of the gross 
wages.  
We also test Equation (9’’) which is obtained under the assumptions that individuals choose 
their labor supply and that hourly taxable wages are rigid. These assumptions imply in particular that 
the hourly gross wage differs from the marginal productivity of labor, a key departure from a perfectly 
competitive labor market. The F-tests indicate that (9’’) is very far from being rejected by the data. 
Plausibly, the hourly taxable wage is determined through bargaining, which does not occur every year. 
This implies that the responses of gross wages to reforms that took place between years t-1 and t are 
delayed, and thus are not reflected in our estimates of 
P






VI.2  Heterogeneous effects 
 
In this Section, we are interested in the effects of taxes on gross wages across subgroups. This 
will also help us to understand the economic behaviors behind our results. First, as mentioned in 
section V, those working 35 hours a week and those working 39 hours a week have been subjected to 
very different payroll tax changes. In order to check the robustness of our main result that wages 
respond differently to income taxes and to payroll taxes, we run separate analyses for the two types of 
employees. The results are reported in Table 3. Because of the subsamples’ size, we keep a subset of 
the LFS and tax records control variables included in column 3 of Table 2.
17 This is the reason why the 
results reported in the first column of Table 3 for the whole sample differ very slightly compared to 
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P P
      1.57 2.05 0.69 
[20.7%] [12.9%] [50.0%] 
Over-identification Sargan test  3.80 3.0 2.91 
[28.4%] [22.2%] [40.6%] 
Tax records variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
LFS variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N° of Observations  12,512  9,509  3,003 
Table 3 - Elasticities for employees working 35-hour and 39-hour weeks 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in brackets.  * denotes significance at 10%, ** 
significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Estimation by 2SLS using instruments I and II. 
Sample: employees present two consecutive years. 
Source: ERF survey, Insee, 2003-2006. 
 
The main results found for the whole population remains qualitatively unchanged, implying 
that Equations (9) are rejected while Equation (9’’) is consistent with the data. However, the small size 
of the 39-hour subsample (column 3) makes the estimates more imprecise. For instance, although the 
                                                       
17 We take a third-order polynomial of base year gross wages instead of a fifth-order one. We drop the indicators 
of household’ type, industry, firm size, and the interaction between firm working time and the year , which are 





   on the 39-hour subsample is very close to that estimated on the 35-hour subsample 
(column 2), it is statistically not significant. Consequently, Equation (9) can no longer be rejected for 
employees working 39-hour weeks; however, Equation (9’’) is much more easily accepted than 
Equation (9). 
  We next present the results for females and males separately in Table 4. In both subsamples, 
the marginal net-of-payroll-tax rate does not significantly affect gross wages, and the elasticity of 
gross wages with respect to the average net-of-payroll-tax rate is negative, significant, and does not 
significantly differ from -1. Consequently, the F-test of Equation (9’’) on both subsamples does not 
reject the nul hypothesis that 
P
  =0 and 
P
  =-1. The responses to income taxation are however very 
different for females and for males. The elasticity 
I
   of gross wages with respect to the marginal net-
of-income-tax rate is significantly positive for females and much higher than on the whole sample. 
Conversely, for males, gross wages do not seem to respond to changes in income taxation. That males 
and females exhibit different responses to income taxation suggests that the responses to income 
taxation highlighted in Table 2 for the whole sample might be the result of labor supply decisions, 
which are notoriously much more important for females than for males. If these responses were due to 
wage negotiation effects, then behavioral responses of males and females would very likely be similar.  
 











(0.081) (0.234) (0.113) 
P
    -0.049 0.120 -0.108 
(0.092) (0.176) (0.111) 
I
    -1.068
*** -0.560  -0.791
 
(0.341) (0.530) (2.037) 
P




(0.267) (0.525) (0.342) 
P I P I
          and : ) 9 (   3.77
** 8.83
*** 0.32 
[2.3%] [0.0%]  [72.7%] 
1 and 0 : ) ' ' 9 (   
P P
      1.57 0.54 0.64 
[20.7%] [58.14%] [52.8%] 
Over-identification Sargan test  3.80 1.83 0.31 
[28.4%] [60.7%] [57.7%] 
Tax records variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
LFS variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N° of Observations  12,512  5,266  7,246 
Table 4 - Elasticities for females and males 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Estimation by 2SLS using instruments I and II. 
Sample: employees present two consecutive years. 




In order to better interpret the mechanisms underlying our findings, Table 5 displays the 
results on different subsamples more particularly affected by the reforms. Column 1 reports the results 
over the whole sample. In column 2, we keep the employees whose earnings at t-1 are lower than 2.2 
times the earnings of an individual working full-time and for the full-year at the minimum wage. As 
explained in Section V, the most important reforms that took place over the period 2003-2006 concern 
those individuals. As expected, the responses to marginal and average net-of-income-tax rates are 
reinforced. However, the response to marginal net-of-payroll-tax rates remains close to zero and 
insignificant. Equation (9) is now rejected at the 1% level, while equation (9’’) is more easily 
accepted. This strengthens our interpretation that the hourly taxable wage is rigid, while individuals 






< 2.2 times the 
Minimum wage at 
t-1 
(2) 
(2) & employed 
full-year at t-1  
(3) 
(3) & employed 
full-year at t 
(4) 
I




(0.081) (0.148)  (0.131) (0.122) 
P
    -0.049 -0.003  -0.048 -0.073 
(0.092) (0.095)  (0.081) (0.073) 
I
    -1.068
*** -1.581
* -0.788  -0.516
(0.341) (0.938)  (0.803) (0.734) 
P





(0.267) (0.312)  (0.277) (0.248) 
P I P I
          and : ) 9 (   3.77
** 5.67  5.05 2.44
* 
[2.3%] [0.4%]  [0.7%] [8.7%] 
1 and 0 : ) ' ' 9 (   
P P
      1.57 1.41  0.50 1.35 
[20.7%] [24.4%]  [60.9%] [25.9%] 
Over-identification Sargan test  3.80 4.29  1.31 0.95 
[28.4%] [36.8%]  [72.6%] [81.2%] 
Tax records variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
LFS variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N° of Observations  12,512  9,979  9,320  9,200 
Table 5 - Elasticities for specific subsamples in the first middle of the wage distribution 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Estimation by 2SLS using instruments I and II. 
Sample: employees present two consecutive years. 
Source: ERF survey, Insee, 2003-2006. 
 
The literature surveyed by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2010) is concerned with potential biases 
due to reversion to the mean. When using reforms concentrated on top-income earners, one has to care 
that getting a very high income at t-1 may be accidental, thereby leading to a negative change in 
earnings between t and t-1. A symmetrical issue can occur at the bottom of the income distribution 
when using reforms concentrated on bottom-income earners, which is our case. An individual not 
working full-year at t-1 (for example a young worker entering the labor market) is more likely to be 
employed full-year at t, thereby leading to a rise in the gross wage that should not be attributed to tax 
changes. Figure 3 suggests that the reversion-to-the-mean phenomenon is very important among  
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bottom-wage earners. The peak in the change in gross wages at the bottom of the distribution becomes 
much lower when the sample is restricted to those employed full-year. Therefore, in order to verify 
that our results are not due to reversion to the mean at the bottom of the distribution, we restrict the 
subsample used in column 2 to those employed 12 months in year t-1. The results displayed in column 
3 indicate that the elasticity with respect to changes in the marginal net-of-payroll tax rate is 
unaffected, while the elasticity with respect to changes in the marginal net-of-income tax rate is 
reduced by a half, while remaining highly significant.  
Interestingly, the reponse to changes in average net-of-income tax rates becomes insignificant. 
This suggests that an important channel through which employees respond to income taxation is the 
choice of the number of working months by year, i.e. an extensive or participation margin. In order to 
test this hypothesis we drop from the subsample used in column 3 those not employed full-year at t. 
Hence column 4 corresponds to the results for the subsample of column 2 of those employed full-year 
at t and t-1. Again, the elasticities with respect to marginal and average net-of-payroll-tax rates are 
unaffected and in line with restriction (9’’). The novelty is that the elasticity with respect to the 
marginal income-net-of tax rate becomes very close to zero and not significant. This confirms our 
presumption that our responses to changes in income taxation essentially reflect participation decisions 
of individuals, rather than hours-of-work intensive decisions of those remaining employed.  
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we estimate the behavioral responses of the gross labor income to marginal and 
average tax rates of both the income and the payroll tax schedules in France over the period 2003-
2006. We use the changes in the schedules of reduction of employers’ social security contribution for 
low paid jobs to identify the responses to the payroll tax schedules. As for identifying the responses to 
the income tax schedule, we use the increase in income tax credit for low wage earners that took place 
over the same period. We find a significant elasticity of the gross labor income with respect to the 
marginal net-of-income-tax rate around 0.2 and our results suggest that this effect is driven by females 
labor supply decisions. Conversely, we find no significant effect of marginal net-of-payroll-tax rate. 
This discrepancy appears robust to different specifications and selections. It is in contradiction with a 
prediction that is common to a large class of models of the labor market, in particular the competitive 
labor supply framework, which plays a central role in the theoretical literature of optimal income 
taxation.   
We also find a significant elasticity of gross labor income to the average payroll net-of tax 
rate, which is not significantly different than minus one. Conversely, the elasticity with respect to the 
average net-of-income-tax rate is much weaker and generally not significant. Among the different 
theories that can account for different behavioral responses to payroll and income taxation, the most  
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plausible one is based on the rigidity of the hourly taxable wage, together with labor supply responses 
to the income tax schedule.  
  This suggests that the payroll tax schedule may be less distortive than income tax schedule, at 
least over the short horizon of our study. Another implication is that reduction of employers’ social 
security contributions that play a very important role in France seems to benefit exclusively to the 
employer, so presumably to the labor demand of low skilled jobs. Moreover, our estimates does not 
support the view that these programs exacerbated a low-wage trap. 
  This work can be extended in different directions. A first direction would be to consider a 
longer panel of observations to investigate the long run responses to taxation. This in particular would 
enable us to test whether the irresponsiveness of taxable wages to payroll taxation is only a short run 
result or whether the responses of gross wages to payroll taxation in the long run are similar to the 
responses to income taxation. Another extension is to disentangle the responses we obtain in terms of 




Aeberhardt, R. and D. Sraer, 2009, Allégements de cotisations patronales et dynamique salariale, 
Economie et Statistique, 429-430, 177-189. 
Auten, G. and R. Caroll, 1999, The Effect of Income Tax on Household Income, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 81(4), 681-93. 
Bunel, M., F. Gilles, and Y. L’Horty, 2009, Les effets des allégements de cotisations sociales sur 
l’emploi et les salaires : Une évaluation de la réforme de 2003, Economie et Statistique, 429-430, 77-
105. 
Blomquist, S. and H. Selin, 2010, Hourly wage rate and taxable income responsiveness to changes in 
marginal tax rates, Journal of Public Economics, 94(11-12), 878-889.  
Cabannes, P-Y, Houdré, C. and Landais, C, 2011, Est-il souhaitable d'augmenter le taux supérieur 
d'imposition des revenus pour consolider les finances publiques ? Une estimation de l'élasticité du 
revenu imposable au taux marginal, mimeo.  
Chetty, R., 2011, Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and Macro 
Evidence on Labor Supply, Forthcoming Econometrica.  
Chetty, R., A. Looney. and K. Kroft, 2009, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, American 
Economic Review, 99(4), 1145-77. 
Feldstein, M., 1995, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study on the 1986 
Tax Reform Act, Journal of Political Economy, 103(3), 551-572. 
Gruber, J., 1997, The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile, Journal of Labor 
Economics, 15 (3, Part 2), S72-S101. 
Gruber, J. and E. Saez, 2002, The elasticity of taxable income: evidence and implications, Journal of 
Public Economics, 84(1), 1-32. 
Hersoug, T., 1984, Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes, Oxford Economic Papers, 36(1), 37-51. 
Holmlund and Söderström, 2008, Estimating Dynamic Income Responses to Tax Reforms: Swedish 
Evidence,  Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) Working Paper 2008-28 
http://www.ifau.se/Upload/pdf/se/2008/wp08-28.pdf   
 
30
Kramarz, F. and T. Philippon, 2001, The impact of differential payroll tax subsidies on minimum 
wage employment, Journal of Public Economics, 82(1), 115–146. 
Kugler, A. and M. Kugler, 2009, The Labor Market Effects of Payroll Taxes in Developing Countries: 
Evidence from Colombia, Economic development and cultural change, 57(2), 335-358 
Liebman, J. and E. Saez, 2006, Earnings responses to Increases in Payroll Taxes, mimeo 
Lindsey, L., 1987, Individual taxpayer response to tax cuts: 1982-1984, with the implications for the 
revenue maximizing tax rate, Journal of Public Economics, 33, 173-206. 
Lhommeau, B. and V. Remy, 2009, Les politiques d’allégements ont-elles un effet sur la mobilité 
salariale des travailleurs à bas salaires ?, Economie et Statistique, 429-430, 21-49. 
Lockwood, B. and Manning A., 1993, Wage Setting and the Tax System: Theory and evidences for 
the United Kingdom, Journal of Public Economics, 52(1), 1-29. 
Mirrlees, J.A., 1971, An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation, Review of Economic 
Studies, 38, 175-208. 
Mortensen, D. and C. Pissarides, 1994, Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of 
Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies, 61, 397-415. 
Pissarides, C.A., 2000, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Second edition, MIT Press. 
Saez, E., 2003, The effect of marginal tax rates on income: a panel study of ‘bracket creep’, Journal of 
Public Economics, 87(5-6), 1231-1258. 
Saez, E., J. Slemrod, and S. Giertz, 2010, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal 
Tax Rates: A Critical Review, Journal of Economic Literature, Forthcoming. 
Saez, E., M. Matsaganis, and P. Tsakloglou, 2011, Earnings determination and taxes: evidence from a 
cohort based payroll tax reform in Greece, forthcoming Quarterly journal of Economics. 
 
Appendix A 
A.1) Proof of Equation (6) 













































































































   * *  
Rearranging terms using Equation (7) gives Equation (6). 
 
A.2) Proof of Equations (5’), (6’) and (7’) 
 




























































































































































































Using (7) and (7’) gives: 
 
 
    





















































A.3)  Sign of  in Equation (9) 
 
  The first-order condition of the maximization of    w R w U ,    writes: F(w,,R)=0, where 
function  F(.,.,.) is defined by:      w r w U w r w U R w F , ' , ' , , 2 1          . Assuming that the 
second-order condition  '
w F < 0 holds with a strict inequality (which is the case if for instance U is 
strictly concave), the implicit function theorem enables us to compute the partial derivatives of 
function (,.) at w*=(,R) through: 
 
'




' ' ' ' '
'
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U U w U
F
F  
    
  
    
  
  
where the partial derivatives of U are computed at w = w* and c=w*+R. Applying (5’) gives: 























   
>0 then follows the assumption that the objective U is increasing in c, i.e.  '





A.4)  Proof of (9’) 
 




I)=0 the first-order condition of the maximization of 
      w R w k R R w U
P P I P I I P , 1          , where function F(.,.,.) is now defined by: 
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. 
 
Assuming that the second-order condition  '
w F < 0 holds with a strict inequality (which is the 
case if for instance U is strictly concave), the implicit function theorem enables us to compute the 
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where the various partial derivatives are computed at w = w* and c=w*+R. Applying (5) while 
taking z*=
Pw*+R
P into account leads to: 
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where the inequalities follow the second-order conditions  '
w F < 0 and  '
1 U > 0. Applying (7) then gives:   
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Therefore we get (9’) as k < 
I and k < 
I. 
 
Appendix B: additional empirical results 
 
Table B.1 reproduces the results of the first stage equations, using the specification and 
method that correspond to the results in Table 2, column 3. Unlike for the other results, we report T 
statistics in brackets instead of standard deviation. In bold are estimates of the direct effects of 
j
t i, log    and 
j
t i, log    on  j
t i, log   : 
 
I
t i, log   
P
t i, log   
I
t i, log   
P
t i, log   
I




(25.74)  (-6.31) (4.29) (0.36) 
P
t i, log    -0.031  0.517
*** 0.009 -0.003 
(-0.97)  (19.38)  (0.96) (2.99) 
I
t i, log    0.026
* -0.008 0.006 -0.003 
(1.70)  (-0.65) (1.32) (-0.71) 
P
t i, log    0.039  0.152
*** -0.020
** -0.010 
(1.19)  (5.46)  (-2.03) (-1.05) 
I
t i, log    0.304 -0.009  0.182
*** -0.292
*** 
(2.05) (-0.07) (4.20)  (-6.14) 
P
t i, log    -0.447 -0.995
*** -0.009 0.263
*** 
(-1.89) (-5.01) (-0.14) (3.79) 
I
t i, log    -0.079 0.042  0.352
***  0.124
*** 
(-0.67) (0.43) (10.19)  (3.60) 
P
t i, log    0.468
* 0.623
*** -0.073  0.365
*** 
(1.84) (2.92) (-0.98) (4.89) 
Tax records variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
LFS  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table B.1 - First-stage regressions 





















Constant  -148.177  62.4073 -162.267 62.77584 -160.196 64.47044 
I
    0.239967 0.084666 0.237658  0.08603 0.225061 0.085914 
P
    -0.00995 0.094904 0.001442 0.096234 0.015545  0.096 
I
    -0.72796 0.328761 -0.78578 0.385905 -0.69477 0.395067 
P
    -1.4372 0.288757 -1.38961 0.292004 -1.74857 0.511287 
2003-2004  -0.02522 0.007704 -0.02636 0.008335 -0.02945 0.014526 
2004-2005  -0.01504 0.007953 -0.01643 0.008759 -0.02147 0.013964 
Terms of the 5-th order 
 polynomial in log wi,t-1 
78.68947 31.297 85.71767  31.51517 84.57709 32.27043 
-16.1052 6.202628 -17.481  6.2519 -17.2832 6.382864 
1.603197 0.607763 1.735336 0.613139 1.723013 0.624238 
-0.07806 0.029459 -0.08429 0.029745 -0.08418 0.030204 
0.001493 0.000565 0.001609 0.000571 0.001617 0.000579 
≤ 29 years  0.026723  0.008623 0.008019  0.00945 
30 - 39 years  0.01576  0.006287 0.009712  0.006543 
50 - 59 years  -0.02746  0.006974 -0.02198  0.007094 
  60  years  -0.11095 0.028075 -0.09784 0.028152 
Women  -0.00327 0.006599 0.004896 0.006917 
Women with a new child since t-1  -0.07767 0.021859 -0.07334 0.021707 
New child since t-1  0.017167 0.015011 0.013593 0.014941 
Women with a child exiting  -0.02671  0.019924 -0.02526  0.019849 
Exit of a child since t-1 0.009469  0.012893 0.008312  0.01282 
Women and child under 18 months  0.005188  0.018167 0.007338  0.018401 
Women and child under 3 years old  0.06572  0.017898 0.05849  0.018216 
Women and child under 6 years old  -0.00849  0.012336 -0.00908  0.012302 
Women and child under 18 years old  0.011144  0.008579 0.010866  0.008592 
Single  individual  -0.01328 0.008408 -0.01377 0.008445 
Single  parent  0.008358 0.010016 0.006936 0.009985 
Couple  with  children  -0.00037 0.007284 -0.00174 0.007252 
“Complex”  household  0.011143 0.014617 0.015207 0.014549 
College (> 2 years)  0.034023  0.012716 
College ( 2 years)  0.023488 0.010968 
High school graduate  0.023217  0.010638 
High-school drop-out or vocational diploma  0.021058  0.009026 
Junior high school or basic vocational  0.016832  0.011743 
Manufacturing 0.004314  0.006169 
Agriculture -0.02141  0.020218 
Construction 0.001379  0.010221 
Energy  -0.00616 0.019172 
Education and social activities  -0.01762  0.009283 
Trade and repair  -0.00133  0.007194 
Engineers, managers and professionals  -0.00766  0.009623 
< 10 employees  -0.00552  0.007982 
10-19 employees  -0.00208  0.009801 
35-hour and 2003-2004  -0.00924  0.013842 
35-hour and 2004-2005  -0.01127  0.014541 
35-hour and 2005-2006  -0.01906  0.010895 
< 1 year  -0.06032 0.023244 
1-5 years  -0.16661  0.021435 
5 - 10 years  -0.16861  0.022446 
 10 years  -0.16409  0.02254 
Table B.2 - Complete results of the model 1 inTable 3 